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Libel cases and public debate – Some Reflections on whether Europe should be 





In recent years, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) have become well-
recognized as challenging free speech and public participation in the United States, Canada and 
Australia. However, in Europe SLAPPs remain largely unrecognized with little consideration of 
their use and impact. This paper argues that SLAPPs are used in Europe and have been 
neglected for a number of reasons. In order to examine the European SLAPP action, the paper 
focuses on libel law in England and Wales. It considers the debate on free speech that has 
flowed out of libel cases and concludes by reflecting on what advantages might flow from a 





Over the last few years, the issue of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) has 
created much activist concern, legislative response and academic comment in the United States.1 
At the same time the concept has been grown in recognition and significance in both Canada2 
                                                 
1 There are many articles published both in discussion of the SLAPP generally and in relation to anti-SLAPP 
legislation developed by States in the USA. See, for example P. Patterson, ‘Have I Been SLAPPed? 
Arkansas’s Attempt to curb Abusive Litigation: The Citizen Participation in Government Act’, 60 Ark. L. R. 
(2007), 507. There are also a number of SLAPP projects based in universities, for example the First 
Amendment Project Anti-SLAPP Resources Centre (see 
<http://www.thefirstamendment.org/antislappresourcecenter.html>) and the California Anti-SLAPP Project 
(see <http://www.casp.net/#>). 
2 S. Lott, Report: Corporate Retaliation Against Consumers: The Status of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
(SLAPPs) in Canada (PIAC, 2004). See Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, Defamation and 
SLAPPs (CIPPIC, undated), found at <http://www.cippic.ca/defamation-and-slapps/>. 
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and Australia3 where environmental activism has been the major targets of SLAPP actions. 
However, the situation in Europe is somewhat different. If you search the academic literature and 
activist debates, the SLAPP has hardly been on the agenda.4 Even in England where the issue of 
free speech, particularly in the context of libel law, has recently given rise to much debate, and 
where the McLibel case seemed to herald the arrival of SLAPPs, the concept is little mentioned.  
This paper provides an overview of the best-known SLAPP cases brought in Europe, most of 
which can be found in England. It will examine some of the reasons why the SLAPP is largely 
unrecognized within the European context despite the existence of such cases. In considering 
why there has been a neglect of the SLAPP, the paper will consider the relationship between free 
speech and public participation and the protection afforded to both by the European Convention 
on Human Rights.5 It will also note the impact of previous high profile SLAPP suits on possible 
litigators, and shifting strategies to silence direct action protests in the UK. The paper will use the 
current demands for reform of the law of libel in England and Wales to examine more closely the 
approach to free speech within Europe and conclude by considering what benefits might arise 
from the inclusion of the SLAPP action in the wider discussion of free speech and public 
participation. 
 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
SLAPPs were first identified in the Uniited States by Canan and Pring in their definitive book 
SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out.6 The SLAPP is something different from an ‘ordinary’ 
attack on free speech; it is an attack on public participation in government. This approach is 
rooted in the American idea that protected speech necessarily involves active public engagement 
with the political process. Indeed, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution extends 
                                                 
3 T. Anthony, ‘Quantum of Strategic Litigation – Quashing Public Participation’, 14(2) Australian Journal of 
Human Rights, (2009), 1. See also Australian Internet campaign and support group for defendants sued by 
a logging company Gunns Ltd.: ‘Stop The SLAPP’, found at <http://www.slapp.org.au/home>. 
4 For discussion of SLAPPs in the European context, see F. Donson, Legal Intimidation (Free 
Association Books, 2000) and S. Kravchenko, ‘Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Law in Eastern 
Europe’, 10 Widener L. Rev. (2003-2004), 475, at 487-491. 
5 European Convention for the Protect ion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 
November 1960).  
6 G. W. Pring, P. Canan, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out (Temple University Press, 1996). 
 3 
protection not only to free speech but also ‘to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.’7 Given this, Canan and Pring identified a number of criteria which, if a lawsuit met 
one of the primary elements and three secondary elements, it could be classified as a SLAPP: 
Primarily, it had to involve communications made to influence a government action or 
outcome, which, secondly, resulted in (a) a civil complaint or counterclaim (b) filed 
against nongovernment individuals or organizations (NGOs) on (c) a substantive issue of 
some public interest or social significance.8 
The definition was designed to be neutral, making no value judgment as to the virtues of either 
the target or the instigator of the lawsuit. 
Canan and Pring also identified the context of these cases highlighting three distinct phases. 
Firstly the citizen becomes concerned about a public issue and will make her view known to a 
government official, agency or the public more generally. This is the political behaviour protected 
by the U.S. Constitution. Secondly, an affected party, unhappy with the citizen’s political 
engagement, files a lawsuit that targets the citizen because of her political stance. This effectively 
transforms the dispute from a matter of public concern to a private legal case focusing attention 
on the harm caused to the filer rather than the political concern of the target. The final stage of 
the process relates to the outcome of the court case. The SLAPP target may be able to 
successfully claim constitutional protection from the court thus re-transforming the case back into 
the public political matter. However, when this does not happen, the litigation will progress as a 
normal case and result in a breach of the targets’ First Amendment rights and effectively chill their 
speech. 
This first definitional account of the SLAPP suit was, as I have indicated, deeply rooted in the 
importance of distinguishing the SLAPP suit from normal attacks on free speech through lawsuits. 
The emphasis is on the participation of the public in the political process and the need to protect 
that participation from more powerful interests who have the resources and knowledge to silence 
their citizen critics.  
                                                 
7 US Const. am. 1. 
8 See G.W. Pring and P. Canan, n. 6 above, at 9. 
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Whilst the USA has a strong constitutional protection for public participation in the political 
process, other jurisdictions have traditionally lacked this express protection so important to an 
understanding of and response to SLAPP suits. The right to freedom of expression in itself can 
offer some impact in tackling intimidatory lawsuits aimed a public participation, but it is the 
identification of the SLAPP and its connection to participation that provides a particular level of 
protection for targets.  
Over time, the definition of the SLAPP has been widened to a more general understanding which 
identifies it as a type of civil action which in many cases does not progress past the writ serving 
stage. In recent years, the main instigators of such action have been corporations, but they may 
also be government, officials or high profile business people. The targets are individual citizens, 
or more often members of community or issue groups.9 The purpose of the lawsuit is to punish 
participation, to discourage others from engaging in similar activity, and finally to silence the 
debate.  
More recent suggestions as to identification of SLAPPs therefore focus on two key elements. 
Firstly the fact that a case is aimed a public participation, which may include protest actions, 
consumer boycott campaigns, pamphlets and other publications, and even web-based campaigns 
including website, blogs and comment. Secondly the plaintiff’s action should be seen as lacking 
merit. Anthony therefore summarizes the looser description as follows ‘SLAPPs can be seen as 
meritless suits designed to intimidate and harass political critics into silence and not to achieve 
the purposes of the action, such as compensation for the wrong.’10  
Thus more emphasis has tended to be placed on the merits/demerits of the party's case in order 
to justify a possible challenge to the case on the basis of abuse of process. The issue of merits is 
potentially problematic however. A case may have merit as to its content, but the challenge to its 
merits may arise where there exists a disparity of power and resources between the complainant 
and defendant. It is often this second form of merit that is most relevant in the discussion of 
                                                 
9 Examples of cases brought by corporations against environmental and campaign groups include the 
McLibel case, discussed below and Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon (1996), O.R. [3d] 215. See 
discussion of this case in C. Tollefson, ‘Strategic lawsuits and environmental politics: Daishowa v., Friends 
of the Lubicon’, 31(1) Journal of Canadian Studies (1996), 119.  
10 See T. Anthony, n. 3 above, at 12 
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SLAPPs and intimidatory lawsuits generally. As a result, the question of merits has been 
regarded as too limited in some jurisdictions with the result that an emphasis has been placed on 
the motivation of the lawsuit not the legal content.11  
As the definition is widened, the distinction between general intimidatory law suits and the SLAPP 
suit, so central to Canan and Pring’s definition, is weakened. Indeed, the SLAPP label has 
become a shorthand method of describing a wide variety of intimidatory or even persecutory 
action.12 However, many of these cases fail to meet the basic elements of the definition and the 
use of the term in this way does little to assist in developing a reasoned response to the SLAPP 
suit. 
Within Europe there have been a small number of high profile imtimidatory legal cases brought 
which clearly fall into the SLAPP category. In the next section, I will examine some key cases and 
consider whether any conclusions can be drawn as to how the domestic and region human rights 
courts have responded to them. 
 
McLibel - The European SLAPP case  
The most high profile SLAPP action to be fought in Europe was that brought by McDonald’s 
Restaurants against two activists. The story of the McLibel litigation was of a corporation, used to 
successfully threatening lawsuits to protect its interests, finally coming up against critics who had 
nothing to lose in defending their right to speech. 
Prior to the McLibel case, McDonald’s had developed an aggressive policy of self-protection. 
Traditional business public relations (PR) and advertising campaigns were backed up with a 
strategy of litigation against alleged trademark infringements and critics.13 Trademark cases were 
                                                 
11 Ibid. For example, see the Australian Capital Territory legislation - Protection of Public Participation Act 
2008, A2008-48, found at <http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2008-48/current/pdf/2008-48.pdf>, which 
focuses on ‘improper purpose’ rather than merit.  
12 For example, the case of Nikitin v Russia, [2004] ECHR 371 has been cited as a SLAPP, however, it 
involves a situation more akin to State persecution as it involved a charge of treason against a former 
captain in the Russian Navy after he assisted in a report on the radiation hazards of Russian submarines. 
He was acquitted but the overall conduct of the prosecution appeared to involve a degree of malicious 
prosecution and bad faith. See J. Gleason, Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation, in S. Sec (ed), 
Handbook on Access to Justice under the Aarhus Convention (REC, 2003), at 59. 
13 See F. Donson, n. 4 above, Chapter 5. 
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often seen as methods of restraining competition whilst McDonald’s typically defended them as 
protecting their corporate interests, whilst legal assaults on critics were characterized as 
protection of business reputation. Whatever the motivations, the strategy worked very well for a 
long period with writers, journalists, publishers and activists generally unwilling to take on the 
costs of a libel action. Typically, critics would capitulate to the demands of the corporation and 
provide an apology and undertake to make corrections where McDonald’s considered this 
appropriate. Interestingly, McDonald’s was able to rely on previously given apologies to support 
further demands for retractions. The fact that many of those apologies were gained regardless of 
the merits of their claims was irrelevant.14  
Things changed for McDonald’s when it decided to undertake the same strategy against 
members of Greenpeace (London).15 The action was to result in the infamous McLibel case: 
McDonald’s Corporation, McDonald’s Restaurants v. Steel and Morris.16 The case was to 
become the longest trial in English legal history, lasting 314 days, and is estimated to have cost 
McDonald’s £10 million.17  
The case centred on a six-page pamphlet entitled ‘What’s wrong with McDonald’s?’ which 
accused the company of ‘McCancer, McDisease and McGreed’ and involved a strident critique of 
many of McDonald’s commercial practices. The leaflet had a low circulation level of just a few 
thousand; however, despite this, McDonald’s mounted a typically aggressive response. The 
company hired a number of private security firms to infiltrate London Greenpeace and having 
realized it could not sue the organization18 in 1990 it decided to sue Morris, Steel and three 
others19 for libel.  
Legal aid was not available to the activists, but they did receive some free legal advice, which 
was summed up as follows: 
                                                 
14 Ibid., at 79. 
15 Greenpeace (London) is a separate organization from Greenpeace International. Although they share 
some history Greenpeace (London) and Greenpeace International have, since 1977, been separate 
organizations and have worked on different campaigns. For more information see the McSpotlight website, 
found at <http://www.mcspotlight.org/people/biogs/london_grnpeace.html> 
16 McDonald’s Corporation, McDonald’s Restaurants v. Steel and Morris, [1997] EWHC QB 366.  
17 See F. Donson, n. 4 above, at Chapter 6. See also J. Vidal, McLibel – Burger Culture on Trial (Macmillan, 
1997). 
18 It was an unincorporated body. 
19 Proceedings against the three others were ultimately withdrawn following their decision to provide the 
company with an apology. See F.  Donson, n. 4 above, at 85. 
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[D]on’t bang your heads against a brick wall, be pragmatic, just say sorry. No one will 
think that you really mean it, you will save yourselves time, energy and money and be 
able to get on with campaigning elsewhere. You can comfort yourself with the fact that a 
trial would hardly be fair if you defended yourselves. Leave while you can.20 
The activists were under no illusions as to McDonald’s motivations in bringing the case – to 
suppress their views and continue silencing critics of the company. Thus despite the legal advice, 
Steel and Morris decided to fight for their right to speak. We can assume that this decision was a 
surprise for the corporation, which had perhaps underestimated the willingness of people with 
nothing to lose to fight on points of principle. 
The trial was to become the subject of a large amount of media coverage and became the focus 
of its own campaign,21 which attracted far more attention than London Greenpeace’s pamphlets 
ever had. Whilst McDonald’s were represented by lawyers highly versed in the complex law of 
defamation,22 Morris and Steel were refused legal aid23 and represented themselves throughout 
the proceedings. Three years after the case had opened, Mr. Justice Bell delivered a judgment24 
running to 750 pages which concluded that McDonald’s had indeed been defamed25 and 
awarding damages of £60,000 despite the fact that McDonald’s had failed to show actual 
damage. No attempt was made by the corporation to recover the damages. 
                                                 
20 See J. Vidal, n. 17 above, at 75. 
21 The campaign was centred on a website called McSpotlight (found at <http://www.mcspotlight.org/>), 
which provided an information portal for information on both the case and the wider issues relating to 
McDonald’s. It continues to operate today. 
22 Defamation occurs when someone makes a false statement that harms the reputation of another. Within 
the area of law related to defamation the specific offences of libel, related to a written or permanent claim, 
and slander, related to a spoken claim, operate to protect a person’s reputation. This paper will for the most 
part discuss the operation of the law of libel, but within the wider context of defamation. 
23 It is estimated that McDonald’s spent over £10 million on its trial expenses, whilst the defendants had to 
rely on money raised by donation to fund their expenses. See J. Vidal, n.17 above, at 6. The fact that legal 
aid was not available in defamation hearings in the UK was raised by the defendants before the European 
Court on Human Rights. See discussion below. 
24 The case was not heard by a jury, but by Mr. Justice Bell sitting alone. This is an unusual development 
and was due to the view that the case was too complex and likely to take too long for a jury. 
25 The court found that Steel and Morris had not proved their allegation against McDonald’s on a number of 
issues including allegations of rainforest destruction, links between their food and serious illness, and bad 
working conditions. However, the court did find that they had proved a number of claims including the 
‘exploitation’ of children through advertising, false claims regarding nutrition, health risks to long-term 
customers and low pay. See J. Vidal, n. 17 above, at 305-314 and F. Donson, n. 4 above, at 94-5. In a case 
of this length and complexity it is hardly surprising that the judgment resulted in partial victories for both 
sides. 
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Steel and Morris appealed the decision and claimed that libel law in England was ‘oppressive’ in 
nature. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on a number of grounds,26 although the Court 
did reduce damages to £40,000. Significantly, it rejected the activists’ claims that corporations 
should not be able to sue for defamation and should be treated in the same way as public 
authorities.27 The court noted that corporations and public authorities were in constitutionally 
different categories, and that the heart of the decision to prevent public authorities suing was the 
idea that people should have the space to criticize their publicly elected officials without fear of 
litigation. The court did not completely dismiss the notion, however, observing that the question of 
whether corporations should lose their right to sue for libel had 'some substance' but that it would 
be for Parliament to act on that issue not the court.28 
 
The impact of McLibel on SLAPPs in the UK 
A significant element of the McLibel case revolved around a clash of cultures between the 
corporation and its targets. The serial litigation strategy of McDonald’s had worked successfully 
against mainstream media outlets. However, when it came up against Steel and Morris, who in 
many ways exemplified the committed activist of the do-it-yourself (DIY) political culture that has 
come to dominate much of British environmental and anti-globalization campaigns, the 
corporation was never going to chill their speech. 
The negative censoring intent, which was recognized by the defendants as being at the heart of 
the McLibel case, was in fact transformed by the commitment, energy and ability of the McLibel 
defendants and their supporters. Indeed, the nature of the court case provided the defendants 
with some very practical benefits. For example, Steel and Morris used the discovery process to 
force McDonald’s to hand over documents that most activists could only dream of seeing, whilst 
                                                 
26. The grounds of appeal also included that if a corporation could sue, then it should be sufficient for the 
defendant to show ‘reasonable belief’ in the words complained of, and that there was abuse of process 
because of the inequality of arms between the parties. For a full analysis of the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, see M.A. Nicholson, ‘McLibel: A Case Study in English Defamation Law’, 18(1) Wisconsin 
International Law Journal (2000), 102, at 102-127. 
27 Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, [1993] AC 534. 
28 Steel and Anor v. McDonald's Corporation and Anor, [1999] EWCA Civ 1144. The applicants were denied 
leave to appeal to the House of Lords and the final stage of the long-running case was heard in the 
European Court of Human Rights in 2005. See discussion below at n. 50 below. 
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the chance to cross-examine McDonald’s executives under oath resulted in a series of damaging 
admissions.  
These elements then fed into the opportunity that Morris and Steel had to spotlight their cause in 
front of the international media. Whilst their lives were utterly overtaken by the case,29 it became 
an activist tool in its own right that resulted in a serious blow to McDonald’s reputation despite its 
victory in the courts. The case therefore illustrated very clearly that activists with nothing to lose 
and a strong enough level of political commitment can transform a lawsuit into a political 
opportunity. Clearly McDonald’s was not mortally wounded by the litigation, but its reputation did 
take a battering.30 
It is well clear that SLAPPs do not work when the target is not silenced, or does not care about 
the threat, or ultimately welcomes the opportunity a SLAPP action offers them. McLibel illustrates 
these components well and is perhaps one reason for the apparent lack of SLAPP actions, using 
libel laws, brought against this type of activist.  However, direct action by environmental activists 
has continued to result in civil litigation, as exemplified by legal action31 brought by Monsanto 
against a number of individuals participating in the genetiX snowball campaign in the late 1990s 
which was part of a direct action campaign against genetically modified crops in the UK.32 This 
litigation largely revolved around applications for injunctions with an emphasis on preventing 
further activism without necessarily attracting large-scale media interest by taking cases as far as 
a full court hearing. Claims for damages to Monsanto’s crops were also very much a part of the 
initial litigation threat although these were later dropped. 
The use of injunctions to prevent protest actions, and in fact to seek injunctions so wide-ranging 
as to effectively stifle activism, has become a much more frequent source of legal action in the 
UK. This shift has also seen an imaginative use of civil powers, which have been reshaped to 
meet the threat of direct action. This trend is exemplified by the Protection from Harassment Act 
                                                 
29 Including all the legal elements, the McLibel case ran from 1990, when the first writ was served, to 2005 
when their application to the European Court of Human Rights judgment was concluded. 
30 The distribution of the original pamphlet rose from 3000 to 3 million copies. The case is generally seen as 
a strategic mistake in PR terms. M. Haig, Brand Failures: The truth about the 100 Biggest Branding Mistakes 
of All Time (Kogan Page, 2003). 
31 Monsanto PLC v Tilly and ors, 1998 - M - No. 851 (High Court) (17 July 1998). 
32 See F. Donson, n. 11 above, Chapter 9.  
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1997 (PHA).33 This legislation was intended to protect the victims of stalkers but was drafted in 
very general terms allowing it to be used in relation to any form of harassing conduct, including 
protest action. Indeed, attempts were made to no avail at the time of legislation to elicit 
reassurances from the British Home Secretary that it would not be used against peaceful 
protesters.34  
Fears that the PHA would be used in this way were quickly realized when injunctions were 
granted against animal rights protesters shortly after the Act was passed.35 Court decisions also 
acknowledged that protest behaviour might under the legislation amount to harassment.36 In 
recent years, injunctions brought under the legislation have been used to ban activists from 
demonstrating in the vicinity of companies, to stop people raising their voices, and even to 
prevent them from taking photographs in certain locations.37 The basis for the granting of the 
injunction is typically that the activities of protesters will cause ‘distress or alarm’ to employees.38  
An example of this extended use of injunctions under the PHA can be found in the attempt in 
2007 by the British Airports Authority (BAA) to gain an injunction against the groups involved in 
‘Plane Stupid’39 in order to prevent the ‘Camp for Climate Action’ from taking place outside 
Heathrow Airport. The application involved one of the widest ranging injunctions ever sought in 
British legal history and could have affected the combined membership of the groups which 
                                                 
33 The law requires that a person not engage in a course of conduct that he knows, or ought to know, 
amounts to the harassment of another. It is not necessary to prove that the person intended to harass 
someone; rather the law imposes a test as to whether a reasonable person who had the same information 
would think that it amounted to harassment. Protection from Harassment Act 1997, (c.40), section 1. 
34 E. Finch, Legitimate Protest or Campaign of Harassment – Protesters, Harassment and reasonableness: 
The decisions in DPP v. Moseley, 5 Web JCLI (1999), found at 2. 
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/issue5/finch5.html>. 
35 Ibid., at 2, noting the case of Brown v O’Neill and ors (unreported) 15 August 1997. 
36 Ibid. Finch makes the point that protest is distinguished under the law from ‘ongoing and protracted 
campaigns of opposition’ which amount to ‘deliberate attempts to force people to desist from carrying out a 
business which they had a legal right to pursue and should not be perceived as and protected in the same 
way as legitimate protests.’ See ibid., at 8. 
37 An injunction under the Act was used on environmental protestors in Oxfordshire. It banned protest and 
also stopped anybody from filming within a mile of the protest site. RWE N Power Plc and anor v Carroll and 
ors HQ07X00505 (High Court) (14 February 2007) court papers found at 
<http://www.epuk.org/News/475/the-npower-injunction-in-full>; SchNEWS, ‘Putting on the writs’, SchNEWS 
581 (27 March 2007), found at <http://www.schnews.org.uk/archive/news581.htm>.  
38 Injunctions are most often sought on an ex parte basis based on limited evidence. A breach of an 
injunction can lead to up to five years in prison.  See Protection from Harassment Act 1997, (c.40), section 
2. 
39 Heathrow Airport Ltd & Another v Joss Garman & Others, [2007] EWHC (QB). Plane Stupid is a network of 
grassroots organizations that are committed to using non-violent direct action against aviation expansion. 
See ‘Plane Stupid – About us’, found at <http://www.planestupid.com/aboutus>. 
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added up to approximately five million people.40 The court was highly critical of the application, 
both in terms of the breadth of the requested order, and the legal source. The use of the PHA 
1997 was described as being ‘entirely inappropriate’41 as the protest group and organizers had 
never done anything that could be considered as being harassment, despite taking part in 
unlawful protest. The court instead granted a civil injunction to prevent unlawful direct action 
protests at Heathrow Airport on the basis that they would have a serious and damaging effect on 
the running of the airport and also that terrorists might use the disruption caused by the protests 
to target airport users. The injunction did not have a power of arrest attached to it, and did not 
interfere with any legal activity the protesters might engage in. It was also limited to Heathrow 
Airport and land surrounding it owned by BAA and would last for one month rather than the 
indefinite order that had been requested by BAA.  
The debate in the UK on limitations on the right to engage in direct action has been ongoing for 
many years, during anti-road protests, anti-globalization protests and now climate change 
protests. Applications for injunctions to prevent occupations, camps, and street protests have 
become a normal response with critics of this form of protest noting that ‘raising awareness is 
fine; causing disruption to no particular end is pointless’.42 George Monbiot, who writes 
extensively in the UK on issues of the environment and political activism commented in response 
to the above comment that: 
Direct action is a demonstration in two senses of the word: a protest and an exposition. It 
drags neglected issues out of obscurity and thrusts them into the political domain. 
Whatever journalists might think of the demonstrators, they cannot help giving them the 
oxygen of publicity.43 
This debate points to an important question in relation to SLAPP suits – what kind of public 
participation is worthy of protection? As will be discussed in the next section, political speech, 
including public protest, is protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
                                                 
40 The targets included all members of the organisations belonging to an umbrella body called Airport Watch.  
See L. Murray, ‘Diary of a Protest’ 36(4), Index on Censorship (2007), 22. 
41 Ibid., at 25. 
42 The High Cost of Cheap Flights, The Guardian (2 August 2007). 
43 G. Monbiot, ‘Because it is illegal, the climate camp is now also a protest for democracy’, Guardian 
Newspaper (7 August 2007) 
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Rights. However, when speech takes the form of protest action the protected speech component 
can become overtaken by the question of legality and public order.44  
 
 
Protection of free speech by the ECHR 
The discussion above has considered the use of SLAPPs and other legal actions against direct 
action and DIY activists particularly in the UK. However, the SLAPP in not confined to this group 
of campaigners; it has potential to chill many different forms of speech and public participation. In 
particular, the use of libel actions against people is, as we have already noted, a key area of 
SLAPP activity, particularly in England. In order to provide a clearer consideration of how 
SLAPPs might be understood in the European context, it is therefore necessary to consider how 
free speech is conceived of in Europe and in particular give some consideration to key provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
The effect of the SLAPP suit is the chilling political speech, closing down the arena for political 
discussion and transforming political speech into a more private legal-based dialogue. It is in the 
area of free speech protection that Europe significantly differs from the USA. Whilst the American 
First Amendment protection is strongly rooted in the protection of political speech, the 
jurisprudence that has developed under the ECHR has been dominated by the wording of its 
Article 10(2) in relation to when freedom of expression can be limited. As noted by Mullis and 
Scott, Europeans may view the American courts as having ‘adopted what can be reasonably 
described as a fundamentalist approach to the value of freedom of expression. In this 
“sanctification” of freedom of speech the United States utilizes a curiously weighted balance in 
the determination of competition between expression and other social values.’45 
The conclusion is that in the American freedom of expression is absolute whilst in Europe the 
exercise of the freedom requires a recognition and account of ‘duties and responsibilities’. Article 
                                                 
44 D. Bonner, H. Fenwick and S. Harris-Short, ‘Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act’, 52 ICLQ 
(2003), 549, at 563-571. 
45 A. Mullis and A. Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A Rejoinder to the Clamour 
for Reform of Defamation’ (UEA/LSE, 2010), at 12. The report was commissioned by Lawyers for Media 
Standards, a campaign group made up of claimant libel lawyers, which aims to influence the debate on libel 
reform by emphasizing the rights to obtain redress of those damaged by the media. 
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10(1) of the ECHR acknowledges that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression’ which 
includes the ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.’ However, the provision goes on to set 
out the allowed limitations:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.  
This should not be understood to mean that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) takes 
a fundamentally different approach to the foundation and significance of free expression than the 
US courts. The ECtHR decision in the case of Handyside v United Kingdom46 sets out the 
foundations of its approach. The court stated that free expression was essential to a democratic 
society which should be able to tolerate and welcome not only favourable and inoffensive speech 
but also ‘those that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population. Such are the 
demands of … pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic 
society”’.47 
Thus political expression is regarded as ‘one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society’48, but one that must be balanced against competing rights. States are required to justify 
any interference with free expression. Three conditions must be satisfied before interference can 
be permitted. These are that the interference must be permitted by law, it must be aimed at 
protecting one of the listed categories within Article 10(2), and it must be necessary within a 
                                                 
46 Handyside v. UK (1976), 1 EHRR 737. 
47 Ibid., at 49. 
48 Ibid. 
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democratic society. It is the protection of reputation49 that operates in relation to the law of libel 
that so often is used in intimidatory lawsuits. Indeed, this ground is in fact most frequently claimed 
under Article 10(2) reflecting the fact that almost every legal system provides a remedy in relation 
to injured reputation. Not all reputations are to be treated alike, however, and the ECtHR has 
concluded that the interest in reputation is in fact less significant where the complainant is a 
public figure50 because of the important social interest in discussing the behaviour and character 
of such people. 
It is at this point that we must return to the McLibel case51 as its final stage was heard in the 
European Court of Human Rights and raised important questions in relation to the balance 
between free expression and reputation, and the role of citizens in engaging in protected speech 
in the political realm. Steel and Morris had applied for leave to appeal to the House of Lords 
following the Court of Appeal decision52 in 1999. However, leave was refused,53 leaving them 
with all domestic remedies exhausted. As a result they were in a position to be able to file an 
application with the ECtHR54 challenging the UK government’s policy on legal aid in libel cases 
and detailing the oppressive nature of libel law in England.  
In relation to the overall claim55 under Article 10, the ECtHR dismissed the claim made by the UK 
government that the applicants were entitled to less protection than the media. In particular, the 
court stressed the significant role played by campaigns carried out by such activists. This is an 
important point, and emphasizes and extends the level of protection previously attached to the 
                                                 
49 See discussion of the importance of reputation in A. Mullis and A. Scott, n. 45 above, at 9-10 and by Lord 
Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers, [2001] AC 127, at 201. 
50 Lingens v. Austria (1986), 8 EHRR 103. 
51 Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom (2005), 41 EHRR 22.  
52 See discussion of Steel and Anor v. McDonald's Corporation and Anor above. 
53 Steel and Anor v. McDonald's Corporation and Anor HL (1999-2000) 233, Judicial Business (21 March 
2000) at 274 
54 Individuals can complain directly to the European Court of Human Rights regarding an alleged breach of 
their rights under the Convention when the alleged breach falls under the provisions of the ECHR, the act is 
by a public authority, the applicant has exhausted all domestic remedies and the application is submitted no 
later than six months after the final decision by the highest competent national authority. See European 
Convention for the Protect ion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, n. 5 above, Article 34. 
55 Steel and Morris also raised an Article 6(1) complaint related to right to a fair hearing. On this matter the 
court concluded that the denial of legal aid to the applicants had deprived them of the opportunity to present 
their case effectively before the Court. There was an unacceptable ‘inequality of arms’ with McDonald's 
given the complexity and length of the case and the legal representation the corporation had been able to 
afford. Ibid., at para. 72. The judgment required the UK government to consider the operation of the law, 
particularly in relation to the availability of legal aid in libel cases. Today legal aid is available in England only 
in exceptional cases, see Legal Aid Act 1988 (c. 34) and the Access to Justice Act 1999 (c. 22). 
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press56 and to NGOs.57 These groups are provided with stronger expression protection under 
Article 10 than an ordinary citizen because of the Court’s view of political expression as central to 
a democratic society. In Steel and Morris the ECtHR concluded that: 
[I]n a democratic society even small and informal campaign groups, … must be able to 
carry on their activities effectively and … [there] exists a strong public interest in enabling 
such groups and individuals outside the mainstream to contribute to the public debate by 
disseminating information and ideas on matters of general public interest such as health 
and the environment.58 
Thus the fundamental approach of the ECHR to political speech (which is rooted in public scrutiny 
and the significance of political debate) allows for campaigners, no matter how few, informal and 
DIY in character, to still be recognized as upholding democratic principles. This is important in 
establishing the concept of a right to participate in public political debate within the European free 
expression debate. An extended understanding of the citizen not only as a recipient of information 
under Article 10, but also as potential watchdog and campaigner in relation to political issues 
more generally, potentially strengthens the idea of participation as protected under free speech 
provisions. 
However, in relation to the applicants’ challenge to the ability of multinational corporations to sue 
under libel law in England, the court rejected the view that businesses should be treated in the 
same way as public authorities:59 
It is true that large public companies inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to 
close scrutiny of their acts and … the limits of acceptable criticism are wider in the case 
of such companies. However, in addition to the public interest in open debate about 
business practices, there is a competing interest in protecting the commercial success 
                                                 
56 See Lingens, n. 50 above. 
57 Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia, no. 57829/00 (27 May 2004). This case involved Vides Aizsardzības 
Klubs (an environmental NGO). The group had been ordered to pay damages to a local official for critical 
remarks made about it in a newspaper article. The Court concluded that the participation of NGOs is 
essential to a democratic society and that for them to perform their functions, they should be able to divulge 
information of public interest and also to comment. 
58 See Steel and Morris, n. 51 above, at para. 89.  
59 In Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers, [1993] AC 534, the House of Lords held that bodies 
performing government functions, such as public bodies, have no standing to sue in defamation because of 
the importance of protecting political communication.  
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and viability of companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, but also for the 
wider economic good.60 
This approach balances the right to free expression under Article 10 with other rights. Critiques of 
allowing corporations to bring libel suits are rooted in seeing them as aggressors with either little 
valid claim to reputation protection, or other methods at their disposal to protect reputation.61 Yet 
as the court points out, corporations have a reputation that is directly linked to their commercial 
success, which requires strong argument to defeat their access to the protection of the law on an 
absolute basis.  
 
Libel cases in England and Wales – A SLAPP by any other name? 
The discussion above in relation to the operation of Article 10 protection for free speech has been 
centred on the issue of libel and the balancing of free expression with other rights. The remainder 
of this article will look in some detail at recent debates and events in England and Wales related 
to libel law and cases which have raised significant concern, as the McLibel case did about the 
operation of the law in this area. 
At the time of the McLibel case, England was described as being ‘ripe for SLAPPs’,62 particularly 
because of the plaintiff-friendly nature of its libel laws. Indeed, McLibel seemed to herald the 
arrival of such cases and there was perhaps an assumption outside England that it would join 
other common law jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia in needing to tackle the SLAPP 
phenomenon head on.  
In fact, there has been little discussion of the SLAPP suit in the English context.63 This is not to 
say that lawsuits are not brought to intimidate, silence and punish political speech and action; it is 
that they are not categorized as SLAPPs. No generic problem of intimidatory litigation has been 
identified and so no impetus to combat them as a class has developed. Instead the more specific 
issue of the law relating to libel is debated in relation to free speech more generally.  
                                                 
60 See Steel and Morris, n. 51 above, at para. 94. 
61 See Free Speech is not For Sale (English PEN and Index on Censorship, 2009), at 11, found at 
<http://www.libel reform.org/our-report >. 
62 J. Wells, ‘Exporting SLAPPs: International Use of the U.S. SLAPP to Suppress Dissent and Critical 
Speech’, 12 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. (1998), 457, at 496 
63 See F. Donson, n. 4 above, particularly chapters.6 and 9. 
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Concerns about libel law have ebbed and flowed over the last few years. The Defamation Act 
1996 was passed in order to simplify the law and respond to complaints from both complainants 
and defendants.64 Ironically, the 1996 Act and other legal developments have generally 
strengthened the protection of (media) defendants in relation to libel actions. For example, the 
1996 Act allows a court to reject weak cases at an early stage. Under section 8 - ‘Summary 
disposal of claim’ – the court can summarily dispose of a case where it appears to ‘no real 
prospect of success’.65  
Equally, the decisions of the House of Lords in the case of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers66 and 
Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe67 established a defence of privilege in cases where the 
area under discussion in the publication is a matter of public interest and where those involved in 
the publication acted in a responsible manner in relation to determining the accuracy of the 
material. In Jameel, the court concluded that this defence should apply ‘to anyone who published 
material of public interest in any medium’.68 
If the law in this area has been improved, then why is the demand for reform of the law of libel in 
England and Wales once more at fever pitch? This was evidenced in 2009 by campaigns for anti-
SLAPP protection being run in national newspapers as well as by campaign groups,69 reports 
published,70 Parliamentary debates71 and the establishment of an expert review panel by the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport.72 Libel is currently 
                                                 
64 For a full discussion of the background and changes that the 1996 Defamation Act introduced, see N. 
Braithwaite, ‘The United Kingdom Defamation Act 1996’, 15 Comm. Law. (1997-1998) at 12-13. In particular, 
the complainants were concerned about the lack of legal aid and the overall costs of bringing libel actions; 
whilst the defendants complained about levels of damages and the fact that they bore the burden to prove 
the truth of a claim. 
65 The court can also give judgment for the plaintiff and grant him summary relief ‘if it appears to the court 
that there is no defence to the claim which has a realistic prospect of success, and that there is no other 
reason why the claim should be tried.’ See Defamation Act 1996 (c.31) Section 8. 
66 See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, n. 49 above. 
67 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe, [2006] IKHR 44. 
68 Ibid., at para. 54 
69 See the Sense about Science website found at 
<http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/index.php/site/project/333/> and the Bad Science website found at 
<http://www.badscience.net/2009/12/libel-reform/> 
70 See Index/PEN, at n. 61 above. 
71 Debate – Libel Laws, 485 HCDeb cols 69-93 (17 December 2008) and English libel law (Parliamentary 
Proceedings), 497 HCDeb cols 272-295WH (21 October 2009). 
72 The Committee monitors policy, administration and expenditure of the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport in the UK. Its website can be accessed at 
<http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/culture__media_and_sport.cfm>. 
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dominating the issue of free speech in England and Wales and beyond. However, it is interesting 
to note that the misuse of libel law, which has been a key element of SLAPP suits, has been 
transformed into an attack on the law itself. The motivations of the complainants have received 
less attention and critique than the lawyers representing them and the law they are using. The 
debate is therefore perhaps missing its real target. Demands for reform of libel law may have 
some useful points but it fails to acknowledge the real problem – the intimidatory and chilling 
effect of attacks on free speech particularly the speech of concerned citizens, campaigners and 
critical experts. 
In many ways, it was a criticism of the law of libel voiced by the United Nations Committee on 
Human Rights in August 2008 that prompted this latest round of concern. The Committee noted 
that libel law in England ‘served to discourage critical media reporting on matters of serious public 
interest, adversely affecting the ability of scholars and journalists to publish their work, including 
through the phenomenon known as libel tourism’.73  
 
 
Simon Singh – A SLAPP victim? 
If McLibel was the case that previously illustrated the dangers of SLAPPs in the UK, it is the 
Simon Singh case that is currently being held up as exemplifying the dangers of libel in relation to 
free and effective public debate. As the discussion below will illustrate, however, understood in 
the light of the SLAPP action, the Singh case is also an example of the continuing use of SLAPPs 
in the UK. The case is said to highlight the dangers of what can happen when the open exchange 
of ideas is attacked. The case was brought in the context of critical discussion related to science 
and medicine. Singh himself has stated that there is a public interest in being able to write 
                                                 
73 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 
of the Covenant: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: concluding observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 30 July 
2008 (CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, 30 July 2008), Paragraph 25, found at 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48a9411a2.html>. Libel tourism is a term used to describe forum 
shopping in libel cases. This process involves plaintiffs choosing to sue in a jurisdiction which is considered 
to be most favourable to their claim. See Y. Lahlou, ‘Libel Tourism: A Transatlantic Quandary’, 2 J. Int’l 
Media & Ent. L. 199 (2008-2009) 
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scientific criticism without fear of ending up in court.74 Simon Singh has specialized in writing 
about science in an open and accessible way, and is the author of the Fermat’s Last Theorem. 
He is currently being sued by the British Chiropractic Association (BCA) after publishing an article 
in The Guardian newspaper in which he described claims made by some chiropractors that they 
could treat common childhood conditions such as asthma as ‘bogus’.   
When the case first arose, The Guardian supported him on the basis that an out-of-court 
settlement with the BCA would be pursued. However, rather than back down, Singh chose to fight 
the case citing the importance of the public interest in debate on science as a key reason. 
Warned that he could face possible legal bills of up to £1 million and large amounts of time eaten 
up by fighting a long and complex case, he, like the McLibel defendants before him, is aware of 
the dangers both financial and temporal. However, he is also conscious of the importance of 
fighting the case, and of the benefits it might deliver in terms of the wider public interest in free 
expression. Another similarity with the McLibel case has also developed, the growth of a 
campaign around the case, although one that is less DIY and more establishment-based.75 
The case is now in its second year but has yet to come to trial. A preliminary hearing was held in 
May 2009 at which Mr. Justice Eady concluded that the use of the word ‘bogus’ in the article 
meant that author was saying that the BCA ‘knowingly’ promoted fake treatments. He also 
concluded that the material was a statement of fact and not comment. This decision will mean76 
that Singh has to prove the factual correctness to the claim that the BCA deliberately put forward 
treatments which it knew did not work. That may prove to be a very difficult task.  
                                                 
74 A similar case is being pursued against Dr. Peter Wilmshurst, an eminent British cardiologist, who is being 
sued for libel by an American corporation NMT Medical. The case, NMT Medical v. Wilmshurst, concerns his 
questioning of trial data relating to Starflex, a device which is supposed to close a hole between the right 
and left atriums of the heart and help reduce migraine. See M. Henderson, Cardiologist will fight libel case 
‘to defend free speech’, The Times (26 November 2009), found at 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article6932252.ece>.  
75 The Sense about Science website notes the following list of supporters, many of whom are well known 
figures from entertainment and science: Stephen Fry, Lord Rees of Ludlow, Ricky Gervais, Martin Amis, 
Jonathan Ross, James Randi, Professor Richard Dawkins, Penn and Teller, and Professor Sir David King, 
former Chief Scientific Adviser to the UK Government.  Sense about Science has joined with Index on 
Censorship and English PEN to campaign for Libel reform. They are also supporting Singh. Information 
regarding the campaign can  be found at the organization’s website at 
<http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/index.php/site/project/333/>.   
76 At the time of writing, the decision is being appealed in the Court of Appeal. C. Tryhorn, ‘Simon Singh in 
court to appeal against ruling over Guardian article’, The Guardian (23 February 2010), found at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/feb/23/simon-singh-appeal>. 
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The Singh case is the latest high profile example of how libel actions are being used against 
those who speak out in relation to matters of public importance in England. The concerns being 
expressed by the critics of the libel law now are the same as those expressed by anti-SLAPP 
campaigners in other jurisdictions, that speech is chilled and critical debate stifled by threats of 
legal action. The belief in relation to the Singh case that the case is about preventing real debate 
on issues of public importance serves to reinforce the SLAPP nature of such cases. 
Indeed, the law relating to libel is thought to be particularly vulnerable to misuse in this area 
because it has for many years been seen as being particularly troublesome in the realm of free 
speech in England. Much of this unease relates to media generated speech, but concerns are not 
confined to the traditional media and can clearly be very relevant to activist and citizen speech. In 
their report entitled ‘Free Speech is Not for Sale’ on the impact of libel law on freedom of 
expression, Index on Censorship and English PEN note the changing nature of today’s media 
environment.77 The growth in ‘citizen journalism’ and the hosting of post-moderated material on 
newspapers websites has given private citizens access to a media platform only previously 
serviced by pamphlets, petitions and local newspapers. The report concludes that ‘this means 
that, increasingly, private citizens without the resources of a newspaper or publisher are being 
forced to defend themselves in an expensive, complex and unfair environment, in which their 
basic rights are not respected.’78 The parallels with the McLibel case are clear, yet rarely if ever 
drawn upon in the discussion. 
Index on Censorship and PEN highlight ten major problems in their report which offers a 
resounding critique of the state of the law claiming that it is becoming ‘increasingly unbalanced’ 
and hinders ‘the free exchange of ideas and information’. 79 The problem it is claimed is greater 
even than the local jurisdiction, because the phenomenon of libel tourism allows foreign cases to 
be heard in London. Key issues include jurisdictional concerns, the cost of litigation, the claimed 
lack of a strong public interest defence, the limited scope of fair comment within the law. It is also 
                                                 
77 See Index/PEN, at n. 61 above. 
78 Ibid., at 6. 
79 Ibid., at 2. 
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interesting to note that Index/PEN voice the same concerns as the McLibel case before the 
ECtHR had with regards to corporation’s ability to sue for libel.80 Yet, others have suggested 
caution in relation to quick reform. For instance,  Mullis and Scott welcome the opportunity to 
further review the law of libel but counter that the overall critique has been ‘too one-sided and the 
reforms proposed ill thought-out, too sweeping and indiscriminate.’81 The fear is that protection of 
reputation that is protected by the law of libel is being forgotten in the clamour for reform. 
 
What role does the SLAPP concept have in Europe? 
Libel law is usually understood to involve the competing interests of free speech and protection of 
reputation, and this is certainly the case in relation to Article 10(2) of the ECHR where the 
protection of reputation or rights of others is an acceptable basis for the limitation of free speech. 
That balancing must recognise the tension between seeking honest speech that is not harmful 
and the requirement within a democratic society that speech is not chilled by a fear of litigation. 
The final resolution of the McLibel case in the ECtHR illustrates some of these elements. In Steel 
and Morris v United Kingdom82 the Court considered that, although the plaintiff in the case was a 
very large multinational company, this should not exempt the applicants from the requirement to 
prove the truth of the statements made. A company was not the same as a public authority, nor 
would it be prevented from taking libel actions to defend its reputation. Thus, any public 
questioning of a business should be balanced against the competing interest in its success and 
viability for the benefit of shareholders and employees as well as for the wider economic good. As 
a result, States are given a wide margin of appreciation to decide how to approach the rights in 
this area. However, the State is still obliged to ensure a measure of procedural fairness and 
‘equality of arms’ in granting a remedy to a corporate body to safeguard the competing interest in 
freedom of expression. In the McLibel case, the ECtHR concluded that the failure to provide legal 
aid for the applicants in the domestic system was a significant factor in assessing the 
proportionality of the interference under Article 10. Also of importance was the size of the award 
                                                 
80 The recommendation in the report is not a complete removal of the right to sue but rather a limitation to 
cases of malicious falsehood. 
81 See A. Mullis and A. Scott, n. 45 above, at para. 3. 
82 See Morris and Steel, n. 51 above. 
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against the applicants. These two key issues were significant in the Court’s decision that the 
interference by the State was disproportionate in this case leading to a violation of Article 10. 
An alternative view is to see defamation cases within the context of power. It is in this area that 
the SLAPP action has been identified to include defamation cases. Gray and Martin state: 
Defamation issues are matters …of power, including the opportunity to publish one’s 
views to mass audiences, the economic resources to pursue or defend legal actions, the 
social power to mobilise support and wage campaigns, and the coercive power to 
intimidate opponents.83 
If threats of libel are on the increase in England, and almost all those who are threatened back 
away from the fight, and potentially also back off from their research and publication strategy, 
then some reflection on the SLAPP concept will be valuable. The parallels between the classic 
SLAPP case and the debate about recent libel cases are clear. If these cases were being brought 
in the USA, for example, they would be identified as SLAPPs and dealt with accordingly. This 
would either involve the use of anti-SLAPP legislation, or a SLAPP-back strategy.84 However, in 
England, the attention is focused very much on the context of libel actions. In the United States, 
the talk would be of public participation in the political sphere, whereas in England the idea is 
rooted in the ‘public interest’. As noted by Grayling: 
Consider the effect of, say, a pharmaceutical giant pitted against clinicians or small 
academic research departments who venture to criticize its products or the protocols of its 
drug trials. Can it be right that a "claimant friendly" libel law should so easily silence 
critical evaluation in an area of indisputable public importance?85 
This raises a number of questions for the English context, and the wider European one too, in 
relation to what value can be gained from re-locating the discussion in the SLAPP context. It may 
practically offer a solution to intimidatory actions brought under the law of libel that does not 
necessarily involve the overhaul of the entire system. If a libel action is brought in order to chill 
                                                 
83 T. Gray and B. Martin, ‘Defamation and the Art of Backfire’, 11 Deakin L. Rev. (2006), 115, at 116. 
84 A SLAPP-back it a counter suit brought by the target of a SLAPP for example claiming malicious 
prosecution or abuse of process.  See D. Merriam and J. Benson, ‘Identifying and Beating a Strategic 
Lawsuit against Public Participation’, 3 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. (1993) 17, 28-34.  
85 A C Grayling, ‘Philosophically Speaking – End Libel Law’s chilling effect on science’, BMJ (2010) 
340:c339 
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speech and intimidate participation, the system needs to arm the target with powers to counter 
this abuse of process. Whilst courts and legislators in the USA, Canada and Australia have been 
responding to the acknowledged threat of intimidation, the English courts have done little. 
However, as Mullis and Scott point out, the courts in England have a right to assess the 
motivations underlying a lawsuit under paragraph 2(b) of Rule 3.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules.86 
This power allows the court to strike out a statement of claim where it amounts to ‘an abuse of the 
court’s process’; that is something that is ‘vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded’.87 The 
courts have concluded that it would occur when a plaintiff has been ‘using that process for a 
purpose, or in a way significantly different from its ordinary and proper purpose’88 or where there 
is coercion of the defendant. As Mullis and Scott note: 
[E]ven a claim with an apparent foundation in the law of tort may be struck out should a 
judge deem such action appropriate. The power has been exercised where a claimant 
has brought proceedings with no intention of bringing them to a conclusion. It might also 
be utilized in the face of SLAPPs.89 
One other solution that the English jurisdiction needs to consider is the possibility of the SLAPP-
back where a defendant counter-sues the claimant; the recent case of Henrik Thomsen is helpful 
in showing the power of this even in the English courts. Thomsen, a Danish radiologist, was sued 
by GE Healthcare, an American company, for libel.90 The case arose out of a 2007 presentation 
Thomsen made in Oxford, and later statements published in his name by a European scientific 
journal in 2008. In both he described his experiences in a Copenhagen hospital in 2006, when 20 
kidney patients injected with the GE Healthcare drug, Omniscan, developed a rare condition 
called nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF). GE Healthcare sued Thomsen for libel and he then 
                                                 
86 Civil Procedure Rules, SI 1998/3132, as amended. 
87 See A, Mullis and A. Scott, n. 45 above, at para 73. 
88 Per Lord Bingham in Attorney General v Barker, [2000] 1 FLR 759, para, 19. 
89 See A. Mullis and A. Scott, n. 45 above, at para 73, referencing the case of Grovit v Doctor, [1997] 1 WLR 
640. To date there are no known cases within the jurisdiction of this power being used in relation to a 
SLAPP suit. 
90 G.E. Healthcare and ors v. Thomsen and anor. (High Court) Claim No. HO 08X01610 (undated), found 
at <http://documents.propublica.org/ge-v-thomsen-a-british-libel-case/page/94#p=53>. 
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counter-sued GE also for libel.91 Although the immediate response of GE was that they would 
‘vigorously defend’ any claim, the case was settled within days.92 
 
What role for the SLAPP concept in Europe? 
Much of the discussion in this article has been focused on libel suits in the English courts as an 
example of how SLAPPs do operate in Europe. However the term SLAPP has been seldom used 
to describe the actions, and there has been little real discussion been given over to the possibility 
of anti-SLAPP legislation. This accurately reflects the current state of legal and political debate 
surrounding free speech in England specifically, and also in relation to Europe generally. The 
effect of the libel law in England and Wales has meant that lawsuits can be easily initiated to stifle 
criticism and debate in a variety of situations, with the current high profile context being in relation 
to science and medicine.  
A question to be considered is whether regarding such actions as SLAPPs would be beneficial to 
the furtherance of this debate and the protection of free speech more generally. Problems are 
certainly present in relation to a shift in attention to the SLAPP. For example, the fundamentals of 
how free speech and public participation is currently understood in the European/English context 
may cause hurdles in embedding the idea within the free speech debate. The limited emphasis 
on the right of public participation in the political sphere, whether in and of itself or as a corollary 
to free speech, is a clear conceptual challenge to this idea. Equally the current jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR in relation to Article 10 suggests that whilst activism is becoming increasingly 
recognized as political speech, it does not currently have the same protection as would be 
afforded under the U.S. First Amendment.  
However, if scholars, commentators and targets come to appreciate such cases as SLAPPs, and 
therefore recognize their effects in both attacking individual speech and inhibiting healthy 
democratic debate and public participation, we in Europe may be better placed to find appropriate 
                                                 
91 D. Leigh, ‘Danish scientist sued by drug firm under British libel laws to counterclaim’, The Guardian (16 
February 2010), found at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/feb/16/scientist-libel-law-henrik-
thomsen>.  
92 D. Leigh, ‘US firm drops libel action against scientist’, The Guardian (18 February 2010), found at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/feb/18/ge-healthcare-henrik-thomsen-libel>.  
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responses to this type of intimidatory litigation. The recognition of SLAPPs will not offer a quick 
fix, just as a reform of the law of libel will not prevent abusive claims being brought. However, it 
will allow for a refocusing of attention on the motivations of SLAPP filers and away from the 
intricacies of any perceived flaws in the libel law and its operation.  More broadly, it will also 
require further scrutiny on the level of protection afforded to public participation in the political 
sphere and its link with the right to free speech.  
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